Does Hamas’s Use of Human Shields Change the IDF’s Proportionality Test?
Israel’s Foreign Ministry says the IDF stays bound to mitigate civilian harm, and places primary responsibility on Hamas’s use of human shields.

In December 2023, after describing 16 years of Hamas “systematically embedding” military assets across Gaza, the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the IDF “is bound to mitigate civilian harm in accordance with the law of armed conflict” and that “it is first and foremost Hamas that bears the responsibility” for civilian suffering. The same statement applies proportionality “to each and every attack independently” and calls the test “conduct-oriented, not result-oriented.” Both halves are the Ministry’s own statement of Israel’s legal position, published by a party to the war.
| Figure | What it counts | Who published it | Period |
|---|---|---|---|
| 16 years | The period over which Hamas embedded military assets across Gaza, on the Ministry’s own statement | Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Stated December 2023 |
| Over 15 million | Text messages warning Gaza residents, a floor; the Ministry’s own count of IDF activity | Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Cumulative to 8 December 2023 |
| Over 12 million | Pre-recorded phone calls, a floor; the same count | Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Cumulative to 8 December 2023 |
| Over 4.5 million | Leaflets airdropped, a floor; the same count | Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Cumulative to 8 December 2023 |
| Over 45,000 | Individual phone calls urging people to leave areas of hostilities and individual targets, a floor; the same count | Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Cumulative to 8 December 2023 |
| 630 | Sectors in the IDF’s civilian-presence map of Gaza, on the IDF’s own description; not a count of people or strikes | Israel Defense Forces, presentation | The war since October 2023, presentation dated 2026 |
| None | Counts of strikes in which shielding was weighed, in the Israeli publications read | Foreign Ministry, IDF, Military Advocate General’s Corps | Publications of 2015 to 2026 |
The Foreign Ministry places responsibility “first and foremost” on Hamas
The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in December 2023 that the IDF “is bound to mitigate civilian harm in accordance with the law of armed conflict.” In the same sentence it stated that “it is first and foremost Hamas that bears the responsibility for the widespread suffering it has caused by instigating the hostilities on October 7 and using civilians as human shields.” Both halves are the Ministry’s own statement of Israel’s position. The Ministry sets out the test it says applies in these terms:
- Each attack is assessed on its own: the principle applies “to each and every attack independently, and it does not relate to the overall use of military force.”
- “An overall casualty figure does not on its own indicate unlawfulness.”
- The test is based on “the military commander’s judgement at the time of the attack, not on hindsight.”
- “Proportionality under international law is not tit for tat.”
- The Ministry’s Key Legal Aspects paper of 2 November 2023 states that the assessment “is based on the facts as they were understood in real-time, and on the military commander’s judgment at that time, not on hindsight.”
The first four lines are from the Ministry’s December 2023 statement and the fifth from its November 2023 paper, each the Ministry’s own statement of Israel’s position. How Israel publishes on proportionality assessments for Gaza strikes is a separate record.
The Ministry says Hamas spent 16 years embedding military assets
The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in December 2023 that “Hamas has spent the last 16 years systematically embedding and dispersing its military operations and assets throughout the entirety of Gaza, viewing Palestinian civilians as expendable human shields.” This is the Ministry’s own statement of Israel’s position, and its words about Hamas stay inside the quotation marks. Its legal paper of 2 November 2023 sets out the same claim and the legal position Israel draws from it.
| Statement, verbatim | Document | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Tunnel access points are “located in homes, mosques, schools and even hospitals” | The War Against Hamas | December 2023 |
| “Hamas’s military infrastructure, command, militants, communications, and weapons are deliberately located within residential, commercial, and other civilian buildings” | Key Legal Aspects, page 9 | 2 November 2023 |
| “many ostensibly civilian objects may become legitimate targets” | Key Legal Aspects, page 2 | 2 November 2023 |
| Civilian casualties “do not of themselves allow for a conclusion in regard to proportionality without an informed assessment of both the expected civilian harm and the military advantage anticipated at the time of the attack” | Key Legal Aspects, page 3 | 2 November 2023 |
Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry’s own statements of Israel’s position. The paper says civilian objects “may become” targets and states the rule in general terms. It identifies no individual building that met it.
The IDF states Hamas told residents to ignore evacuation warnings
The Israel Defense Forces stated, in its “Hamas use of human shields” materials on a page dated 14 July 2014, that Hamas broadcast messages telling residents to ignore IDF evacuation warnings. The same materials state that Hamas sites military infrastructure, headquarters, launchers and weapons storage in residential buildings, hospitals, mosques and schools. Both are the IDF’s own statements, published during the 2014 conflict.
For the war after October 2023, the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs recorded the volume of IDF evacuation warnings cumulative to 8 December 2023. These are the Ministry’s own counts of IDF activity, counting messages sent through each channel:
One person can receive a text, a call and a leaflet, so the four counts are not a number of people warned.
A warning never on its own affected proportionality, the Ministry states
The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in its May 2015 report on the 2014 conflict that “the provision of a warning never, on its own, affected a proportionality assessment.” The report is Israel’s own account of IDF conduct from 7 July to 26 August 2014. The Ministry’s 2023 papers carry a matching statement for the current war, also its own account of IDF conduct.
| Statement, verbatim | Document | Period it describes |
|---|---|---|
| After a warning “the IDF did not assume that a relevant site or area had been evacuated” | The 2014 Gaza Conflict, paragraph 306 | 7 July to 26 August 2014 |
| “the provision of a warning never, on its own, affected a proportionality assessment” | The 2014 Gaza Conflict, paragraph 306 | 7 July to 26 August 2014 |
| “the IDF does not assume that there are no civilians in areas or sites where advance warnings had been given” | Key Legal Aspects | The war, to 2 November 2023 |
| “Israeli strikes that do not meet this threshold have been, and will continue to be, aborted” | The War Against Hamas | The war, to December 2023 |
Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs; each statement is Israel’s own account of IDF conduct. The Ministry’s record on strikes called off when civilians appear is published separately.
No Israeli publication here quantifies human shields in any strike assessment
The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs papers of 2015 and 2023, the Military Advocate General’s Corps publication updated 3 August 2024 and an IDF presentation dated 2026 publish no count of strikes in which shielding was weighed. None publishes a count of civilians assessed as shields, or a proportionality assessment of any individual strike. Each is a party’s own account of its own conduct or processes.
The IDF presentation, its own description of its own procedure, sets out the decision flow for an intelligence-based target at slide 18:
The flow asks whether civilians are in the target and carries no shielding category. The slide does not state what follows a “No” at any step.
Every figure here is Israel’s own count or statement
- The warning counts are the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ own count of IDF activity, cumulative to 8 December 2023, and each is a floor.
- They count messages sent per channel, not people warned, and may not be added together.
- The 16 years is the Ministry’s own statement of Israel’s position.
- The 630 counts sectors in the IDF’s own civilian-presence map, not people, strikes or evacuations.
- The 2015 report is Israel’s own account of IDF conduct in 2014, not of the war after October 2023.
- Statements about Hamas’s conduct are the Ministry’s and the IDF’s own, quoted as such.
Questions readers ask
Does Israel say human shields remove the duty of proportionality?
The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in December 2023 that the IDF “is bound to mitigate civilian harm in accordance with the law of armed conflict,” while placing primary responsibility for civilian suffering on Hamas. That is the Ministry’s own statement of Israel’s position. The statement does not say that human shields remove the obligation.
Does a high death toll show a strike was disproportionate, on Israel’s account?
The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in December 2023 that “An overall casualty figure does not on its own indicate unlawfulness.” On the Ministry’s own statement of Israel’s position, each attack is assessed separately.
Who judges whether a strike is proportionate?
The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated on 2 November 2023 that the assessment rests on “the military commander’s judgment at that time, not on hindsight.” That is the Ministry’s own statement of Israel’s legal position.
How many warnings did the IDF send to Gaza residents?
The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs recorded over 15 million text messages, over 12 million pre-recorded calls, over 4.5 million leaflets and over 45,000 individual calls, cumulative to 8 December 2023. These are the Ministry’s own counts of IDF activity, each a floor, and the channels may not be summed.
Are civilians who stay after a warning still counted in the assessment?
The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in 2015 that, in 2014, “the provision of a warning never, on its own, affected a proportionality assessment.” Its 2 November 2023 paper states that “the IDF does not assume that there are no civilians in areas or sites where advance warnings had been given.” Both are the Ministry’s own account of IDF conduct.
Can the IDF strike without a warning?
The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated on 2 November 2023 that “Where circumstances do not permit providing effective advance warning before an attack,” such as when a militant “may exploit the warning to escape,” there is “no legal requirement to do so.” That is the Ministry’s own statement of Israel’s legal position.
Does Israel say a civilian building can become a military target?
The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated on 2 November 2023 that “many ostensibly civilian objects may become legitimate targets.” The Ministry’s own paper states the rule in general terms and names no building that met it.
Does Israel apply Additional Protocol I?
The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated on 2 November 2023 that Israel “abides by all applicable rules of customary international law, including those embodied in conventions to which it is not a party (such as the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions).” That is the Ministry’s own statement of Israel’s position.
How does the IDF track where civilians are in Gaza?
The Israel Defense Forces stated in a 2026 presentation that a Southern Command team led by a brigadier general divided Gaza into 630 sectors and continuously assessed the population present in each. That is the IDF’s own description of its procedure, and 630 counts sectors, not people.
Does the IDF call off strikes when civilians are present?
The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in December 2023 that “countless attacks have been aborted or avoided completely in order to prevent harm to civilians.” That is the Ministry’s own account of IDF conduct, and “countless” is its word, not a number.
Is roof knocking required by international law, on Israel’s account?
The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in 2015 that in 2014 the IDF used it “as a progressive precaution that went beyond the requirements of international law.” That is the Ministry’s own account of IDF conduct in the 2014 conflict.
How many criminal investigations has the IDF opened over Gaza?
The Military Advocate General’s Corps opened 74 criminal investigations as at 3 August 2024, on its own count of its own processes. The Corps states that civilian death or injury “in most cases do not by themselves indicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.” The 74 are investigations opened, not findings, indictments or convictions.
Does Israel publish how many civilians it treats as human shields?
The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs publications of 2015 and 2023, the Military Advocate General’s Corps publication of 2024 and the IDF’s 2026 presentation publish no such count. Each is a party’s own account of its own conduct or processes.
Sources
- Israel Defense Forces. Stated precautions in Gaza and the human-shields position: “Hamas use of human shields” page, dated 14 July 2014. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/hamas/hamas-use-of-human-shields-in-gaza/. Official or primary record, a party’s own stated position.
- Israel Defense Forces, 2026. “Process of target attack”, presentation on targeting and civilians, slides 10 and 18. Presentation, the IDF’s own description of its own procedure; not an official IDF publication.
- Israel Defense Forces, Military Advocate General’s Corps, 2024. Addressing Alleged Misconduct in the Context of the War in Gaza. Published 24 February 2024, updated 3 August 2024. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/military-advocate-generals-corps/addressing-alleged-misconduct-in-the-context-of-the-war-in-gaza-published-february-24-2024/. Official or primary record, the party’s own reported counts.
- Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015. The 2014 Gaza Conflict (7 July to 26 August 2014): Factual and Legal Aspects, Chapter VI: IDF Conduct of Operations During the 2014 Gaza Conflict. Dated May 2015, released 14 June 2015. https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/idf-conduct-of-operations-during-the-2014-gaza-conflict/en/English_Documents_IDF1-Conduct-2014-Gaza-Conflict.pdf. Official or primary record, a party’s own account of its own conduct.
- Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023. Hamas-Israel Conflict 2023: Frequently Asked Questions. Updated to 8 December 2023. https://www.gov.il/en/pages/swords-of-iron-faq-6-dec-2023. Official or primary record, a party’s own published position and counts.
- Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023. Hamas-Israel Conflict 2023: Key Legal Aspects. Updated to 2 November 2023. https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/swords-of-iron-faq-6-dec-2023/en/English_Documents_Hamas-Israel%20Conflict%202023%20-%20Some%20Factual%20and%20Legal%20Aspects%20-%20Israel%20Ministry%20of%20Foreign%20Affairs%20(2%20NOV%202023).pdf. Official or primary record, a party’s own statement of its legal position.
- Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023. The War Against Hamas: Answering Your Most Pressing Questions. Republished by the IDF on 15 December 2023. https://m.www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/israel-at-war/all-articles/the-war-against-hamas-answering-your-most-pressing-questions. Official or primary record, a party’s own statement of its legal and factual position.


