Does the IDF Use AI to Choose Targets in Gaza?
The IDF answers no: it says Habsora and Lavender assist analysts, a human identifies each target, and operational commanders approve strikes.
The Israel Defense Forces answers “No” to the question “Does the IDF use AI to select targets in Gaza?” on its page about data technologies, published 18 June 2024 and updated 14 September 2026, its own account of its own procedures. It states that Habsora, a tool first used operationally in 2021, and Lavender, which it calls a general-purpose database, do not select targets. It states that a human analyst identifies each target, an authorised intelligence officer approves it, and an operational commander decides whether to strike, and it publishes no count of targets either tool suggested.
| Figure | What it counts | Who published it | Period |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Year the IDF states Habsora was first used in an operational setting, in an earlier operation in Gaza | Israel Defense Forces | Stated 18 June 2024, updated 14 September 2026 |
| 3 | Decisions open to a senior commander on a pre-planned attack: approve, suspend or abort | Ministry of Foreign Affairs | 2014 Gaza conflict, report dated May 2015 |
| 5 | Blocks on the Target Card the Ministry reproduces, one of them a binding legal review | Ministry of Foreign Affairs | A 2014 target, report dated May 2015 |
| Dozens | Law-of-armed-conflict experts added to the Military Advocate General’s International Law Department in active hostilities, the Ministry’s own description | Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Since 2007, stated May 2015 |
| 9 | Steps in the IDF’s targeting process, from intelligence collection to execution, with legal review at step 7, the IDF’s own account | Israel Defense Forces presentation, supplied to IsraelFact | Undated presentation |
| 2 | Limbs of the military-target definition in the same presentation: objects, and persons | Israel Defense Forces presentation, supplied to IsraelFact | Undated presentation |
The IDF says Habsora and Lavender do not select targets
The Israel Defense Forces states that both tools “help intelligence analysts review and analyze existing information,” and that “they do not autonomously select targets for attack.” The descriptions are the IDF’s own account of its own tools.
| Tool | What the IDF says it is | What the IDF says it does not do |
|---|---|---|
| Habsora | A tool that “fuses large amounts of data from across disparate datasets” and suggests “certain physical objects” for an analyst to research, first used operationally in 2021 | Its suggestion “cannot be solely relied upon to identify a target without being thoroughly explored by the intelligence analyst” |
| Lavender | “A general-purpose database that organizes and cross-references layers of several existing intelligence sources” | “This is not a list of confirmed military operatives eligible to attack” |
| Both | Tools that “focus the analyst on information that is likely to be relevant” | “They do not generate orders for strikes” |
Responding to a New York Times investigation in December 2024, the IDF said that “officers always verified the information provided” by AI systems, and that AI tools were no more than a “starting point” of target selection, as The Times of Israel reported on 26 December 2024.
A human analyst identifies each target, the IDF states
The Israel Defense Forces states that under the Intelligence Directorate’s standard operating procedure “this identification process must always be done by a human intelligence analyst, who is trained and authorized to carry out such work,” its own account of its own rules. The steps it describes:
- The analyst identifies a target, applying the SOP’s definitions of “military objectives”, which follow international law.
- The target “is subject to approval by an authorized intelligence officer.”
- “The IDF’s intelligence regulations in force do not permit for any technologies to make target identification determinations in place of humans.”
- “Intelligence officers who identify targets are not the ones who also decide to strike those targets.”
The IDF’s presentation defines a military target in 2 limbs
The IDF’s presentation “Process of target attack”, supplied to IsraelFact and not published by the IDF, defines a military target in 2 limbs, one for objects and one for persons. The definition is the IDF’s own wording, on its slide 8:
- Objects “which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”
- “A Member of an enemy armed force, a member of an organize [sic] armed group, or a civilian directly participating in hostilities (for such time that he does so)”
The IDF’s presentation sets out 9 steps from intelligence to strike
The same presentation sets out the IDF’s targeting process in 9 steps, its own account of its procedure, on slide 6. Analysis and the identification of military objectives come at steps 2 and 3, legal review at step 7 and commanders’ approval at step 8, and the slide names no tool or system at any step.
| Step | On the slide |
|---|---|
| 1 to 3 | Intelligence collection; analysis; identifying military objectives |
| 4 to 6 | Link to mission; validation; planning |
| 7 and 8 | Legal review; commanders’ approval |
| 9 | Execution, battle damage assessment and lessons learned |
Source: Israel Defense Forces, “Process of target attack”, slide 6, supplied to IsraelFact.
Who decides whether to strike?
An operational commander decides, the Israel Defense Forces states: “The decision whether to strike is made by the commander after considering this information and input, as well as operational, policy, humanitarian, and legal considerations.” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ report on the 2014 conflict, dated May 2015, describes the same step as “a highly-regulated, multi-tiered process for approving pre-planned attacks,” its own account of the IDF’s process.
| Decision on a pre-planned attack | The Ministry’s wording |
|---|---|
| Approve | “approve the attack (where appropriate, subject to certain conditions)” |
| Suspend | “suspend the attack (for instance, because more information about potential collateral damage is necessary)” |
| Abort | “abort the attack altogether” |
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The 2014 Gaza Conflict: Factual and Legal Aspects, Chapter VI, paragraph 245.
The IDF’s presentation, supplied to IsraelFact, describes the approving commander on its slide 16 as “an officer who has been professionally and operationally qualified for this role and possesses the authority to authorize strikes against designated targets.”
What role do legal advisers play in approving a strike?
A legal adviser gives “a binding opinion regarding the legality of an attack, plus any stipulations for its execution” for pre-planned attacks, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in its May 2015 report, which reproduces a translated Target Card from 2014. The Ministry states that the Military Advocate General “is appointed by the Minister of Defence (a civilian authority), not by the IDF Chief of General Staff,” and its November 2023 paper states that IDF legal advisers “are not subject to the IDF chain of command on professional matters.”
| Block on the Target Card | What it holds, on the Ministry’s account |
|---|---|
| Intelligence | The target and its surroundings |
| Operational Directives | The objectives commanders set, and any conditions they add |
| Operational Planning | The means and methods, and the precautions possible |
| Legal Review | The legal adviser’s binding opinion |
| Conditions | All conditions gathered in one place, with legal conditions marked |
In the 2014 example the legal advisers “conditioned their approval on the provision of an effective advance warning” and recommended “real-time visual surveillance,” and the commander added “that the attack be conducted at night.”
The Ministry states fact-specific legal advice is not always available in real time
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in its May 2015 report that “the exigencies of combat do not always allow for a targeting process involving this level of deliberate pre-planning and pre-approval,” and that “certain input, such as fact-specific legal advice, will not be available in real time.” It gives the example of a platoon commander “required to take immediate action in response to coming under fire.” In such cases, on the Ministry’s account, commanders “rely on the training they have received, as well as directives that specify the checks and authorisations required prior to carrying out attacks.”
The IDF publishes no count of targets the tools suggested
The Israel Defense Forces’ page of 18 June 2024, updated 14 September 2026, carries one figure, the year 2021, and no count of the tools’ output. Absent from it:
- Objects Habsora suggested to analysts, for any period
- People listed in the Lavender database
- Targets identified, approved or struck, for any period
Where these figures come from
The IDF page describes current procedures and is the IDF’s own account. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs report describes the targeting process in the 2014 conflict, and its Target Card is a 2014 example; neither stands for the other period. “Dozens” is the Ministry’s own word and not a count. The December 2024 remarks reach this page through The Times of Israel. The presentation is the IDF’s own account, supplied to IsraelFact and not published by the IDF, and it carries no date on its face.
Questions readers ask
What is Habsora?
The Israel Defense Forces states, in its own account, that Habsora is a tool, first used operationally in 2021, that suggests physical objects for an analyst to research, and that its suggestion cannot alone identify a target.
What is Lavender?
The Israel Defense Forces states that Lavender is “a general-purpose database” cross-referencing intelligence sources, and “not a list of confirmed military operatives eligible to attack.”
Does AI approve IDF strikes?
The IDF Spokesperson stated on 11 September 2026 that strikes are selected and approved “by human personnel only” and “not by artificial intelligence.”
Is the IDF’s targeting process automated?
The Israel Defense Forces answers “No” on its page updated 14 September 2026, and states that identification, review and approval involve human personnel.
Who approves a strike?
The Israel Defense Forces states that “the decision to approve an attack rests with an authorized operational commander,” on its page updated 14 September 2026.
Can the analyst who picks a target also order the strike?
The Israel Defense Forces states that “intelligence officers who identify targets are not the ones who also decide to strike those targets.”
Are the IDF’s legal advisers under its commanders?
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that IDF legal advisers are not subject to the chain of command on professional matters and report to the Military Advocate General, in its November 2023 paper.
Is a legal adviser’s opinion binding?
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in its May 2015 report that the MAG Corps’ legal opinions “are binding upon the IDF, including with regard to the legality of individual attacks.”
What happens when there is no time for legal review?
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that commanders then rely on their training and on directives specifying the checks required, in its May 2015 report.
Did the IDF comment on AI in December 2024?
The IDF said that “officers always verified the information provided” by AI systems, as The Times of Israel reported on 26 December 2024.
What are the steps in the IDF’s targeting process?
The IDF’s presentation “Process of target attack”, supplied to IsraelFact, sets out 9 steps, from intelligence collection to execution, with legal review at step 7 and commanders’ approval at step 8.
How does the IDF define a military target?
The IDF’s presentation defines a military target as an object making “an effective contribution to military action” whose destruction “offers a definite military advantage”, or a member of an enemy armed force or organised armed group, or a civilian directly participating in hostilities.
When did the IDF first publish its account of these tools?
The Israel Defense Forces published its page on data technologies on 18 June 2024 and last updated it on 14 September 2026.
Sources
- IDF Spokesperson, Israel Defense Forces, 2026. The IDF Spokesperson’s Response Following the Publication of the Movie “NAZA”. 11 September 2026. idf.il. Official or primary record.
- Israel Defense Forces, 2026. “Process of target attack”, a presentation on targeting and civilians, slides 6, 8 and 16. Supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF. The IDF’s own account of its procedure.
- Israel Defense Forces, 2024. The IDF’s Use of Data Technologies in Intelligence Processing. Published 18 June 2024, updated 14 September 2026. idf.il. Official or primary record.
- Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015. The 2014 Gaza Conflict: Factual and Legal Aspects, Chapter VI: IDF Conduct of Operations During the 2014 Gaza Conflict. Dated May 2015, released 14 June 2015. gov.il. Official or primary record.
- Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023. Hamas-Israel Conflict 2023: Key Legal Aspects. Updated to 2 November 2023. gov.il. Official or primary record.
- The Times of Israel, 2024. “IDF loosened rules of engagement after Oct. 7, allowing more civilian deaths – NY Times.” 26 December 2024. timesofisrael.com. Israeli press, carrying the IDF’s response.
