Does the IDF Set a Limit on How Many Civilians a Strike May Kill?
No Israeli publication read here sets a number. The Foreign Ministry says excessive harm is not measured in absolute numbers, and the IDF assesses each strike.
No Israeli publication read here sets a number of civilians a strike may kill: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in its May 2015 report on the 2014 Gaza conflict that excessive civilian harm “is not measured using absolute numbers” and is assessed case by case against the military advantage a commander anticipates. The Israel Defense Forces states, in its own account on a page updated 14 September 2026, that every attack requires “an individual assessment” of expected civilian harm, made “in relation to each specific strike, and not categorically.” Responding to a press investigation in December 2024, the IDF confirmed that its rules of engagement changed when the war broke out, as The Times of Israel reported; no Israeli body has published those rules in the material read here.
| Figure | What it counts | Who published it | Period |
|---|---|---|---|
| Over 6,000 | Aerial strikes against military objectives the IDF conducted in the 2014 conflict, its own count, published by the Ministry | Ministry of Foreign Affairs | 7 July to 26 August 2014 |
| 8 | Civilians the Ministry states were killed when people returned to a warned building after a bomb was released, an incident it calls exceptional | Ministry of Foreign Affairs | 8 July 2014 |
| 3 | Limbs of the proportionality test Israel’s Supreme Court applies to a military measure | Israeli Supreme Court, HCJ 2056/04 | Judgment of 30 June 2004 |
| 14 September 2026 | Latest update of the IDF page requiring “an individual assessment” for each strike | Israel Defense Forces | Page first published 18 June 2024 |
| 26 December 2024 | Date the IDF confirmed its rules of engagement changed when the war broke out | Israel Defense Forces, as reported by The Times of Israel | The war from 7 October 2023 |
| 8 | Boxes in the IDF’s decision flow for an intelligence-based target, one asking “Civilians in Target?” before “Permission to Strike” | Israel Defense Forces presentation, supplied to IsraelFact | Undated presentation |
| 15 | Clips of the IDF’s own strike footage in which people near the target are the reason a strike is called off, held or diverted | Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact | 4 April 2024 to 12 July 2026 |
Excessiveness “is not measured using absolute numbers,” the Ministry states
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in its report on the 2014 conflict, dated May 2015, that commanders “must analyse the proportionality of each and every attack,” and that excessiveness “is assessed on a case-by-case basis, in light of the specific military advantage anticipated by the commander based on the information reasonably available to him at the time of the attack.” The report is the Ministry’s own account of the IDF’s conduct in 2014.
| Element of the assessment | What the Ministry’s report states |
|---|---|
| What is weighed | Expected incidental harm to civilians and civilian objects, against the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated |
| Whose judgment | The commander’s, on “the information reasonably available to him at the time of the attack” |
| The threshold | “As long as there is no significant imbalance between the expected collateral damage and the anticipated military advantage, no excessiveness exists” |
| Who assists | “engineers and damage-assessment specialists,” and “remotely piloted aircraft” monitoring civilian presence in real time |
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The 2014 Gaza Conflict: Factual and Legal Aspects, Chapter VI, paragraphs 325 and 330.
The IDF states each strike gets an individual assessment
The Israel Defense Forces states on its page on data technologies, published 18 June 2024 and updated 14 September 2026, that “IDF procedures require conducting an individual assessment of the anticipated military advantage and the incidental damage expected to civilians and civilian objects.” The page is the IDF’s own account of its own procedures.
- The assessments “are to be made in relation to each specific strike, and not categorically.”
- The IDF’s targeting procedures “do not permit carrying out strikes on a category basis, without conducting individual assessments per strike.”
- Collateral damage is assessed “in view of all reasonably available information, in order to achieve the most accurate assessment possible.”
- The steps before a strike “include the obligations to apply feasible precautionary measures and conduct a proportionality assessment.”
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs made the same point in its FAQ updated to 8 December 2023: proportionality “is to be applied to each and every attack independently, and it does not relate to the overall use of military force,” and “one attack causing 500 casualties should logically, and legally, be seen differently than 500 attacks against military objectives resulting overall in the same number of casualties.”
Does a warning remove civilians from the estimate?
No: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in its May 2015 report that after a warning “the IDF did not assume that a relevant site or area had been evacuated,” and that “the provision of a warning never, on its own, affected a proportionality assessment.” The statements are the Ministry’s own account of the IDF’s practice.
| Statement | Publication | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Adherence to “prior general or specific warnings provided by the IDF was not presumed” | Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014 conflict report, executive summary | May 2015 |
| Civilians who stayed despite warnings were not discounted “for purposes of its proportionality analyses” | Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014 conflict report, Chapter VI | May 2015 |
| “The IDF does not assume that there are no civilians in areas or sites where advance warnings had been given” | Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Key Legal Aspects | Updated to 2 November 2023 |
The IDF’s decision flow asks “Civilians in Target?” before a strike
The IDF’s presentation “Process of target attack”, supplied to IsraelFact and not published by the IDF, sets out a decision flow for an intelligence-based target in 8 boxes, one of them “Civilians in Target? Yes | No”. The presentation is the IDF’s own account of its procedure, and it states that the IDF “routinely reviews targets after the target-clearing procedures, and wherever feasible uses visual and intelligence means to ensure that the area is clear of civilians.” The boxes, in the slide’s order:
| Box | What the slide asks or states |
|---|---|
| Intel based targets | “Define Exact Location” |
| Evacuation | “Area Evacuated? Yes | No” |
| Sensitive sites | “Proximity to Sensitive Sites? Yes | No” |
| Civilians | “Civilians in Target? Yes | No” |
| Warning | “Warning Considerations” |
| Weaponry | “Choose The Right Munition” |
| ROE | “Target Coherent RoE? Yes | No” |
| Approval | “Permission to Strike” |
Source: Israel Defense Forces, “Process of target attack”, slides 17 and 18, supplied to IsraelFact. No box states a number of civilians.
A redacted IDF target card records a conditional legal review
A target card in the IDF’s presentation, marked “Top Secret” and redacted as supplied to IsraelFact, records a legal review with the status “Conditional”. The military objective reads “Arms cache and operational meeting place in a residential building”, the condition reads “the provision of an effective advance warning”, and the recommendation reads “Real-time visual surveillance”; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ May 2015 report gives the same condition and recommendation for the 2014 Target Card it reproduced. The card’s conditions box, as shown:
| Condition on the card | Box |
|---|---|
| Real-time visual surveillance | Ticked |
| Nighttime | Ticked |
| Individual warning to civilians in the target | Ticked |
| Individual warning to civilians in surrounding structures | Not ticked |
| Legal conditions | Ticked |
Source: Israel Defense Forces, “Process of target attack”, slide 15, supplied to IsraelFact with names, dates and the target ID blacked out. One example, not a count.
The Ministry judges a strike by what a commander expected at the time
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in its Key Legal Aspects paper, updated to 2 November 2023, that “compliance is conduct-oriented, not result-oriented,” and that an attack causing more collateral damage than expected “does not necessarily indicate a violation.” Its May 2015 report calls the analysis “forward-looking, based on what a reasonable military commander could anticipate under the same or similar circumstances.”
The same report gives an example it calls exceptional, the Ministry’s own account. On 8 July 2014 in Khan Yunis, civilians warned out of a building were “identified as approaching or returning to the premises after the bomb had been dropped but before it hit its target,” there was “no technical possibility of diverting the bomb or aborting the attack,” and “eight civilians lost their lives.”
IDF footage shows strikes stopped as people came near the target
The IDF’s own strike footage, supplied to IsraelFact and not published by the IDF, shows people near the target given as the reason a strike is called off, held or diverted in 15 of 18 clips, dated on screen from 4 April 2024 to 12 July 2026. The clips are a set, not a sample, and give no count of strikes carried out. Two are below.
- There is a person walking south, on the eastern route
- He will probably pass close to the target during execution [of the attack], about fifty meters
- Copy that, aborted
- We suspect that there is a woman in the car with him
- Stand by while we confirm
- Copy, we are standing by
The IDF confirmed its rules of engagement changed when the war began
The Israel Defense Forces, responding to a New York Times investigation published 26 December 2024, confirmed that its rules of engagement had changed when the war broke out and maintained that all practices remained consistent with international law, as The Times of Israel reported the same day. That is the IDF’s own response, paraphrased by the outlet.
- The IDF has published no text of its rules of engagement in the material read here.
- It has published no per-strike threshold for civilian harm, for any period, in the material read here.
Where these figures come from
The 2014 figures and the Khan Yunis example are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ own account of the IDF’s conduct in 2014, and describe that conflict, not the current war. The 14 September 2026 page is the IDF’s own account of its current procedures. The rules-of-engagement confirmation reaches this page through The Times of Israel’s paraphrase, and carries no figure. “Over 6,000” is a floor. The presentation and the 18 clips are the IDF’s own material, supplied to IsraelFact and not published by the IDF; the presentation carries no date on its face.
Questions readers ask
Is there a fixed number of civilians the IDF allows per strike?
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in its May 2015 report that excessiveness “is not measured using absolute numbers” and is assessed case by case.
Who decides whether expected civilian harm is excessive?
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the commander decides, on the information reasonably available at the time of the attack, and the IDF states that an operational commander approves each strike.
Does the IDF assess civilian harm for every strike?
The Israel Defense Forces states on its page updated 14 September 2026 that its procedures require “an individual assessment” for each strike, “not categorically.”
Did the IDF change its rules of engagement after 7 October 2023?
The IDF confirmed in December 2024 that its rules of engagement changed when the war broke out, as The Times of Israel reported, and stated its practices remained consistent with international law.
Has the IDF published its rules of engagement?
No text of the IDF’s rules of engagement appears in the Israeli publications read here, and the IDF’s stated standard is the individual assessment on its 14 September 2026 page.
Does a later civilian death toll make a strike unlawful?
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in its November 2023 paper that “compliance is conduct-oriented, not result-oriented,” judged on what the commander expected at the time.
Are civilians who ignore a warning counted in the estimate?
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in its May 2015 report that the IDF did not discount civilians who stayed after a warning in its proportionality analyses.
How many strikes did the IDF carry out in 2014?
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states the IDF conducted over 6,000 aerial strikes against military objectives between 7 July and 26 August 2014, the IDF’s own count.
What proportionality test do Israel’s courts apply?
The Israeli Supreme Court held on 30 June 2004 in HCJ 2056/04 that a military measure needs a rational connection to its aim, the least injurious means, and injury in proper proportion to the gain.
What does the Ministry say about one strike against many?
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in its FAQ updated to 8 December 2023 that one attack causing 500 casualties is to be seen differently from 500 attacks causing the same total.
Does the IDF check for civilians just before a strike?
The IDF’s presentation “Process of target attack”, supplied to IsraelFact, states that the IDF “routinely reviews targets after the target-clearing procedures” and asks “Civilians in Target?” before “Permission to Strike”.
What does an IDF target card record?
A redacted card in the IDF’s presentation records a legal review marked “Conditional”, on “the provision of an effective advance warning”, with real-time visual surveillance recommended.
What does the title NAZA mean?
The Times of Israel reported on 14 September 2026 that the title is a Hebrew acronym meaning collateral damage; no Israeli publication read here defines it.
Sources
- Israel Defense Forces, 2024 to 2026. Footage of strikes called off, held or diverted, eighteen clips, on-screen dates 4 April 2024 to 12 July 2026. Supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF. The IDF’s own footage.
- Israel Defense Forces, 2026. “Process of target attack”, a presentation on targeting and civilians, slides 15, 17 and 18. Supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF. The IDF’s own account of its procedure.
- Israel Defense Forces, 2024. The IDF’s Use of Data Technologies in Intelligence Processing. Published 18 June 2024, updated 14 September 2026. idf.il. Official or primary record.
- Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015. The 2014 Gaza Conflict: Factual and Legal Aspects, Chapter VI: IDF Conduct of Operations During the 2014 Gaza Conflict. Dated May 2015, released 14 June 2015. gov.il. Official or primary record.
- Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023. Hamas-Israel Conflict 2023: Frequently Asked Questions. Updated to 8 December 2023. gov.il. Official or primary record.
- Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023. Hamas-Israel Conflict 2023: Key Legal Aspects. Updated to 2 November 2023. gov.il. Official or primary record.
- Israeli Supreme Court, 2004. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel. Judgment of 30 June 2004. Official or primary record.
- The Times of Israel, 2024. “IDF loosened rules of engagement after Oct. 7, allowing more civilian deaths – NY Times.” 26 December 2024. timesofisrael.com. Israeli press, carrying the IDF’s response.
- The Times of Israel, 2026. IDF chief floats legal action against ‘NAZA’ film, orders probe of leaked material. 14 September 2026. timesofisrael.com. Israeli press.
