Why Did Israel Fail to See the October 7 Attack Coming?
The IDF’s expert team named 6 central factors for the 7 October failure, and the Israel Security Agency dates detection of the plans to 2018 and 2022.
6 central explanatory factors for the failure of 7 October 2023 are named in the summary the Israel Defense Forces published on 10 November 2025, setting out the conclusions of an expert team appointed by the Chief of Staff on 22 March 2025. The team examined 25 IDF investigations in depth and interviewed about 80 relevant office-holders, and its central finding, in its own words, is that the surprise “did not emerge from a vacuum empty of information”. This is a party reviewing its own investigations of its own failure, and the team stated that it examined IDF investigations only, and not the space between the political and military echelons or between the IDF and parallel security bodies.
| Figure | What it counts | Who published it | Period |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6 | Central explanatory factors the expert team named for the failure | Israel Defense Forces | Summary published 10 November 2025 |
| 25 | IDF investigations examined in depth by the team | Israel Defense Forces | Investigations held from 7 March 2024 |
| About 80 | Office-holders interviewed by the team, on its own count | Israel Defense Forces | Team appointed 22 March 2025 |
| None | Commanders or intelligence personnel the team identified as having assembled an enemy situation picture, on its own review | Israel Defense Forces | Night before the attack, 7 October 2023 |
| 2018 and 2022 | Years Hamas invasion plans were detected by Israeli intelligence, on the agency’s own account | Israel Security Agency | Findings published 2025 |
The IDF expert team named 6 central factors for the failure
The Israel Defense Forces summary records six central explanatory factors, drawn by a team of its own appointment reviewing its own investigations. The factors are the team’s own framing and the summary does not rank or weight them.
- A conceptual failure about Gaza and Hamas
- An intelligence failure in understanding the threat and in not giving the warning
- The absence of engagement with the “Jericho Wall” plan
- An organisational and operational culture of deficient norms entrenched over years
- A substantial continuing gap at every command level between the reference threat and the operational response
- Deficient decision-making and force employment on the night itself
The Security Agency says the attack could have been prevented
The Israel Security Agency states that Hamas invasion plans were detected by Israeli intelligence in 2018 and again, in greater detail, in 2022, and that “these plans were never fully processed as an imminent threat, which led to a lack of preparation”. The agency states the attack could have been prevented had it acted differently. This is the agency’s own inquiry into its own conduct, published by it and reported through Ynetnews and The Times of Israel.
No one assembled an enemy situation picture that night
On the night before the attack the Israel Defense Forces team identified no one, among commanders or in the intelligence community, who assembled an enemy situation picture thoroughly and professionally, on its own review of the IDF’s own investigations. The summary records that no intelligence picture was formed and no professional discussion was held on raising the alert level, and that in the critical hours before the attack “not one significant action was taken among the line forces or the reserves”.
The same summary records that during 2023 senior military figures warned that Israel’s enemies had identified a process of internal weakening that harmed deterrence and raised the likelihood of escalation, and that the required military steps to improve readiness were not taken.
The team attributed failures to the General Staff and 4 commands
The Israel Defense Forces summary attributes the failure by body, in its own review of its own conduct. It also lists the Air Force and Navy as contributing, with the qualification that no alert level was raised and no readiness level changed, which might have let them respond faster.
| Body named | What the summary attributes to it |
|---|---|
| General Staff | Severely underestimating an enemy it had itself defined as a “terror army” |
| Operations Directorate | Named among the bodies to which failure is attributed |
| Intelligence Directorate | A collection concept in Gaza resting on access too narrow to permit warning |
| Southern Command | Named among the bodies to which failure is attributed |
| Gaza Division | Named among the bodies to which failure is attributed |
Source: Israel Defense Forces, Chief of Staff’s summary of the expert report, published 10 November 2025, the IDF’s own attribution of its own failure.
The “Jericho Wall” plan was never investigated, the team found
The Israel Defense Forces team identified subjects that had not been investigated at all and recommended completing them, chief among them how information that arrived over the years was handled, and the systemic and operational aspects of the “Jericho Wall” plan. The Chief of Staff stated that a broad systemic investigation is still needed covering the inter-organisational and inter-echelon interfaces not yet examined, accepted the recommendations, and appointed the Deputy Chief of Staff to oversee implementation.
The published record here is the military’s own. On the political echelon, and on the interfaces between the IDF and parallel security bodies, this summary states that the team did not examine them and publishes no findings.
Which figures here are a body’s own account of its own conduct?
The Israel Defense Forces summary is a review of the IDF’s own investigations by a team the Chief of Staff appointed, and the Israel Security Agency findings are that agency’s inquiry into itself.
The 25 and the about 80 count different things: 25 is investigations examined, 80 is people interviewed, and neither is a count of the investigations the IDF conducted in total, which the summary does not give.
The 2018 and 2022 detection dates are the Israel Security Agency’s, and the review dates are the Israel Defense Forces’; they belong to two bodies and to two separate inquiries.
The six factors are the team’s own framing, are not ranked, and are not presented by the team as a causal chain.
Questions readers ask
Who conducted the review of the 7 October investigations?
A team headed by a major general in the reserves, appointed by the Chief of Staff on 22 March 2025, reporting to the Chief of Staff and the General Staff forum, as the Israel Defense Forces published on 10 November 2025.
Did Israeli intelligence hold the Hamas attack plans before 7 October?
The Israel Security Agency states that invasion plans were detected in 2018 and in greater detail in 2022, and that the plans were never fully processed as an imminent threat.
Does any Israeli body say the attack was preventable?
The Israel Security Agency states, in its own investigation into its own conduct, that the attack could have been prevented had it acted differently.
How many investigations did the expert team examine?
The Israel Defense Forces reports that the team examined 25 investigations in depth and interviewed about 80 relevant office-holders.
Which investigations were under review?
Those held from 7 March 2024, on the then Chief of Staff’s order for an internal General Staff investigation of the war, as the Israel Defense Forces published.
What did the team say about the hours before the attack?
The Israel Defense Forces summary records that no intelligence picture was formed, no professional discussion was held on raising the alert level, and “not one significant action was taken among the line forces or the reserves”.
Which bodies did the review name?
The Israel Defense Forces named the General Staff, the Operations Directorate, the Intelligence Directorate, Southern Command and the Gaza Division, with the Air Force and Navy listed as contributing.
What did the review say about the intelligence collection in Gaza?
The Israel Defense Forces states that the Intelligence Directorate’s collection concept in Gaza rested on access too narrow to permit warning.
Were there warnings during 2023?
The Israel Defense Forces summary records that senior military figures warned during 2023 that Israel’s enemies had identified a process of internal weakening that harmed deterrence and raised the likelihood of escalation, and that the required readiness steps were not taken.
What remains uninvestigated on the IDF’s own account?
The Israel Defense Forces reports that how information arriving over the years was handled, and the systemic and operational aspects of the “Jericho Wall” plan, had not been investigated, and recommends completing them.
Does the review cover the political echelon?
No. The Israel Defense Forces states that the team examined IDF investigations only, and that a broad systemic investigation of the inter-organisational and inter-echelon interfaces is still needed.
Does another Israeli body audit military conduct?
The State Comptroller of Israel published a special report in March 2018 auditing the IDF’s examination and control mechanisms in Operation Protective Edge, including whether training carried the humanitarian rules of international law; that report also records that an earlier audit, drafted in 2014, was not published.
Sources
- Israel Defense Forces, 2025. Chief of Staff’s summary of the expert report on the quality of the 7 October investigations and the lessons drawn from them. IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, idf.il/315803, published 10 November 2025. Official or primary record.
- Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), 2025. Findings of its own investigation into 7 October. Reported by Ynetnews and The Times of Israel. Official or primary record.
- State Comptroller of Israel, 2018. Operation Protective Edge: IDF Activity in Aspects of International Law, and the Examination and Control Mechanisms of the Civilian and Military Echelons. Special report, March 2018. Official or primary record.
