Are Israeli Police Wiretap Permits Properly Documented?
130 of 359 administrative communications-data permits examined lacked complete documentation, on the State Comptroller’s January 2026 audit.
130 of 359 administrative permits for obtaining communications data lacked complete and proper documentation meeting the procedure’s requirements, in controls the Israel Police Cyber Division ran between December 2020 and August 2021, published by the State Comptroller of Israel in January 2026. The report writes the share as about 36%. The 359 are the permits those controls examined, not a count of permits the police issued, and the audit publishes a deficiency count rather than a count of permits certified as properly documented.
| Figure | What it counts | Period |
|---|---|---|
| 359 | Administrative communications-data permits examined in the Cyber Division’s controls, in cases where field units received the data and analysed it | December 2020 to August 2021 |
| 130 | Of those 359, the permits lacking complete and proper documentation meeting the procedure’s requirements | December 2020 to August 2021 |
| about 36% | The share of the 359 examined permits lacking that documentation, as the report writes it | December 2020 to August 2021 |
| about 30 | Controls run by the Cyber Division, most examining one week of a field unit’s execution of permits and some up to a month | December 2020 to August 2021 |
| 7 of 7 | Matters checked in the control of wiretapping at one field unit in which recurring defects were found | 2020 |
| 1 | Defects recorded as corrected, the method of identifying speakers | 2020 |
Source: State Comptroller of Israel, 2026, Use of Technological Tools for Enforcement Purposes, chapter 4.
130 of 359 permits examined lacked complete, proper documentation
The State Comptroller recorded the 130 twice in the same chapter, once as the finding of the Israel Police Cyber Division’s own controls of its field units and once as the audit’s own finding. The test applied is the one set by the police procedure, whether the documentation was complete and proper as that procedure requires, so the count is a function of that standard. The 130 and the 359 are the two counts the audit prints.
- Whose count: the Cyber Division’s own, run over the field units it supervises, and confirmed by the State Comptroller.
- What the permits are: administrative permits for obtaining communications data, examined where field units had received the data and analysed it.
- What the figure is not: a count of permits found unlawful, and not a share of all permits the police issued.
The 359 are communications-data permits, not wiretap orders
Communications data and wiretapping are treated as two separate matters in the chapter, and the 359 belong to the first. The State Comptroller reported on wiretapping through the controls run at a field unit rather than through a permit population, so no permit share exists for wiretap orders. The wider supervision counts below are counts of the police’s own internal control activity, taken from that activity’s own records.
| What the audit counted | Figure | Period |
|---|---|---|
| Administrative communications-data permits examined | 359, of which 130 lacked complete documentation | December 2020 to August 2021 |
| Professional-guidance controls performed | 259, of which 256 covered only field-deployed units | 2019 to 2021 |
| Controls of the operational response department | None | 2021 |
Source: State Comptroller of Israel, 2026, chapter 4.
A 2020 control found defects in every wiretap order examined
The 2020 control of wiretapping at one field unit found recurring defects in every order examined, across all seven matters checked, and the State Comptroller recorded the method of identifying speakers as the only defect corrected. The control was run by the Israel Police over its own unit, and it covers the orders examined at that unit rather than any national total. The audit prints no count of wiretap orders in force.
- 7 of 7 matters checked carried recurring defects, on the police’s own 2020 control at one field unit.
- 6 of 7 deficiency areas remained uncorrected at the 2020 follow-up, on the Comptroller’s examination.
- No annual control by the head of the cyber division is recorded across 2018 to 2022, other than one in 2020.
About 30 controls examined mostly one week of unit activity
About 30 controls were run by the Israel Police Cyber Division between December 2020 and August 2021, and the State Comptroller recorded that most examined one week in which field units executed administrative permits, with some covering up to a month. The 359 permits sit inside those sampled windows. The word “about” is the report’s own, and the count of controls is the Division’s own record of work it did on itself.
- About 30 controls, December 2020 to August 2021.
- Most covered one week of a field unit’s activity; some covered up to a month.
- The 359 permits, and the 130 within them, are drawn from those windows.
No Israeli body publishes a total of wiretap permits issued
Neither the State Comptroller’s 2026 audit nor any other Israeli official publication in the record used here carries an annual count of wiretap orders issued or communications-data permits granted, a court approval or rejection count, or a documentation rate across the whole Israel Police. What the audit publishes is what its controls examined and what those controls found.
- No annual total of communications-data permits granted by the Israel Police.
- No annual total of wiretap orders sought, granted or refused.
- No force-wide documentation rate, and no compliance count derived from the 359.
Which figures here may not be divided into one another?
The 359 permits and the 259 professional-guidance controls count different things over different periods and are not a ratio. The 130 is a deficiency count within the 359, so the remaining 229 are permits the audit did not report as deficient rather than permits it certified as properly documented. The 7 of 7 matters at one field unit in 2020 belong to wiretapping and cannot be added to the communications-data permits. All figures are the Israel Police Cyber Division’s own records of its own controls, published by the State Comptroller in January 2026.
Questions readers ask
How many of the permits examined were properly documented?
The State Comptroller published a deficiency count rather than a compliance count: 130 of 359 examined administrative permits lacked complete and proper documentation, and no figure is published for the rest.
Which permits do the 359 refer to?
The State Comptroller recorded them as administrative permits for obtaining communications data, examined in cases where police field units had received the data and analysed it.
Who ran the controls that produced the 130?
The Israel Police Cyber Division ran them over its own field units, and the State Comptroller reported the finding both as the Division’s and as the audit’s own.
Does the 36% cover the whole Israel Police?
The State Comptroller recorded it as a share of the 359 permits the controls examined, which came from about 30 controls between December 2020 and August 2021, so it is not a force-wide rate.
How long a period did each control cover?
The State Comptroller recorded that most of the roughly 30 controls examined one week of a field unit’s execution of permits, and some covered up to a month.
What did the audit find on wiretap orders themselves?
The State Comptroller recorded that the 2020 control at one field unit found recurring defects in every order examined, across all seven matters checked.
How many earlier deficiency areas had been corrected?
The State Comptroller found 6 of 7 deficiency areas still uncorrected at the 2020 follow-up, with the method of identifying speakers recorded as corrected.
How often did the head of the cyber division run an annual control?
The State Comptroller recorded no annual control by the head of the cyber division across 2018 to 2022, other than one in 2020.
Who published these figures, and when?
The State Comptroller of Israel published them in January 2026, in chapter 4 of a special report on the use of technological tools for enforcement purposes.
Does any Israeli body publish how many wiretaps the police carry out?
No annual count of wiretap orders or communications-data permits appears in the audit, which measured supervision and documentation rather than volume.
Does the State Comptroller publish counts of complaints against police officers?
The State Comptroller reported 11,776 complaints opened at the Police Investigations Department between 2019 and 2021, and of 5,356 final decisions taken in 2021, 68, being 1.2%, ended in a criminal indictment.
Has the Comptroller examined police record-keeping elsewhere?
The State Comptroller reported that about 55,000 suspects’ files were closed for lack of evidence in 2020, about 60% of the files closed that year, and that the Israel Police hold no data in their computerised systems on files closed for lack of guilt.
Sources
- State Comptroller of Israel, 2026. Use of Technological Tools for Enforcement Purposes: Wiretapping and Communications Data, chapter 4, Police Supervision and Control over the Use of Communications Data and the Conduct of Wiretaps. Special report, Shevat 5786, pp. 174 to 183. library.mevaker.gov.il. Official or primary record.
- State Comptroller of Israel, 2023. The Handling by the Police Investigations Department and the Police of Offences by Police Officers. Systemic Issues, chapter 105, May 2023. library.mevaker.gov.il. Official or primary record.
- State Comptroller of Israel, 2022. Closing Criminal Files by the Israel Police and the Office of the State Attorney. State Comptroller Report, May 2022, chapter one. library.mevaker.gov.il. Official or primary record.
